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To be both history and historian is something new for me. 
You are not the first to speak of Trade and Payments as his­
tory, which I never intended it to be. But you are the first 
to ask me to do so as well, and I am puzzled as to how to 
respond.
I am honored by your invitation and grateful for it.That 
this old work of mine has some interest for you is most 
pleasing. I shall be intrigued by finding out wherein that 
interest lies. (Perhaps by the time I give this talk*I shall 
know; remember that these lines are written in advance of 
seeing your papers and hearing the discussion). Naturally, I 
shall be happy if you have found some things in the book that 
are still of value. But even if you want to show me how wrong 
I was or that I ignored major points to which I should have 
paid attention, that will still be of great interest. You must 
know many things about the period that I do not and are bound 
to have a different way of looking at these matters.
I can learn. Although I can also be stubborn, I do not 
think it likely that I shall want to stick to some conclusion 
or opinion just because I wrote it down long ago. (Naturally,
I shall not assume that the contrary is correct simply because 
it has been more recently argued). It is for you historians 
to tell me what you think holds up, what is demonstrably wrong 
and what needs to be reconsidered. You have materials at your 
disposal that I did not have. You can base questions on later 
experience that I could not foresee. You also have, I suppose, 
a different approach —  or a number of different approaches —  
since you write as historians and I was only trying to clarify 
end analyze contemporary events.
ir ~Prepared for a talk at a conference on The Origins of the 
European Community;Challenge and Response in western Europe, 
1946-1950. organized by Professor Alan Milward at the European 




























































































Looking back now, we share a common time perspective.
But even that may not really be the same since I imagine there 
is a difference in quality between time in which one has lived 
—  or been aware -- and time one has only read and heard about, 
however deeply it has been studied.
So much for the book as history, at least for the moment.
I still face the question of how I can try to be an historian 
myself and look at the book and the activities it deals with 
from that perspective. I certainly cannot bring the book up 
to date, either in the sense of continuing some of the sto­
ries that are broken off or introducing new material to cor­
rect or amplify what is there. I have not continued to study 
that period or restudied the issues or even read very much 
of what has been written about these matters in recent years.
To be sure, I occasionally come across something that deals 
with the issues discussed in the book or that makes me think 
about them. Once in a while I ask questions of people who 
know about these events -- or once did. Occasionally people 
ask me questions that stir up memories and call for an effort 
to think about some past events -- provided one can recall 
them correctly (and that is not always easy to tell). But I 
have nothing systematic to build on, so even if a few obser­
vations can be gleaned from the occasional reminders, they 
cannot sustain a general reassessment.
There is another obstacle to my looking backward: facts 
and the detailed data from which one can derive conclusions 
and against which one can test ideas. There are two versions 
of a familiar saying. Is it God who is in the details, as I 
have heard architects say? Or is it the Devil, as a German 
central banker once told me? Perhaps both. Historians, I know, 
have doctrines about such matters and perhaps do not always 
agree about them. But for me the situation is simple -- and 
stark. When, for the first time in years, I looked quickly 
through Trade and Payments to see if I dared accept Professor 
Milward's attractive invitation — - I have since reread it more 
or less properly -- one of my strongest reactions was how 





























































































that work was very detailed. As the notes and the bibliography 
show, I plowed through mountains of documents,streams of news­
papers and any number of journals. The small portion of all 
this that was carried over into the book may well have been 
too detailed but that seemed necessary at the time, to acquaint 
readers with unfamiliar developments and to make the case for 
some of the views I was advancing. On rereading, I found not 
only that I had forgotten many of these things but that some­
times I had forgotten that I ever knew them. Nevertheless,
I am convinced that my understanding of some of the larger 
issues (as well as my willingness to make some generalizations 
and draw some conclusions) required this sort of study of the 
details. There were, after all, any number of widely accepted 
ideas that did not stand up to analysis, or at least proved 
to be incomplete or inadequate for the uses to which they were 
put once one got into the details. It was easier to move ahead 
when ideas were not generally accepted. Differences of opinion 
and interpretation help one to clarify matters, whether they 
are put forward in all honesty or in support of a particular 
interest. Not everything could be documented, either in a 
literal or a more general scholarly sense.
I tried to read between the lines -- and hear between them 
as well. As I recall it, most people were very kind about ta­
king time to talk with a visiting scholar. Sometimes it may 
have been simply that I was interested in what they were doing. 
Sometimes they were anxious to get across some point of view, 
or make sure I was not unduly influenced by someone else. But 
most of the time, if I remember correctly, it was a matter of 
helping me to understand what I had not quite grasped from 
what I had read or of providing an interpretation that there 
was no normal occasion to put in print. Not that everyone I 
talked with was an official. I saw many academics, quite a 
few newspaper people and a substantial number of businessmen.
1 had the benefit of study and discussion groups at the Council 
on Foreign Relations and at comparable organizations
in western Europe, such as Chatham House, the Centre d"Etudes 





























































































studies in Belgium, Holland, Italy and later Germany. One 
conversation led to another, with the same person or someone 
else. I owe a great deal to all these people; without them 
the book would have been much shallower, if it could have been 
written at all. Many of them are not named in the book because 
that seemed the best way to preserve a private relationship.
A few, I fear, have been forgotten, along with the names of 
sane others. Quite a few, though, are to be found in my notes 
or memory and there are some who became friends with whom I 
can still discuss such issues, though more often in terms of 
what is new than what was old.
One reason I had to talk to so many people and pile up so 
much written material was that the study had to cover a large 
number of issues (some of which, in the end, did not get into 
the book). The approach had to be broad as well as detailed 
because so many things were under way. One could not tell 
which efforts would make progress; quite different kinds of 
activity affected one another. Failures could be as instruc­
tive as successes —  provided one knew enough to understand 
them. The air was full of ideas, governments were full of 
activists, obstructionists abounded —  one had to keep track 
of them all.
Don't worry, I am not going to reconstruct the process 
by which the book was written. I am not an Ancient Marriner, 
stopping you to tell my tale. I am only trying to explain 
why I cannot discuss Trade and Payments by reexamining its 
detailed arguments, reassessing its many assessments or second- 
-guessing my younger self. If there are any questions of 
interest to others as to my methods, or even my sources, I 
should be glad to answer them as best I can. It was a long 
time ago but I have at least a few notes and letters that 
would help. I even have a few thoughts of my own about the 
process of writing contemporary history that were partly 
stimulated by the preparation of this paper.
For now, though, what I am trying to say is that writing 
the 1952 book required long wandering in a rather dense forest 
which I shall not enter again, being no longer "nel mezzo 



























































































Still, I need an answer to the question as to how I should 
respond to your invitation to look at Trade and Payments in 
historical perspective —  an invitation I find enchanting, 
if daunting. I have concluded, quite arbitrarily, that I 
should make use of three perspectives, or optiques.
First I shall say a word about the setting in which the 
book was written, why its subject seemed important and how 
some of the major issues looked to people at the time. Then 
I will make some comments on how the book's treatment of some 
of its larger issues strikes me today. This will sometimes 
lead to asking what additional questions ought to be studied. 
Third, I shall subject you to a few thoughts about how some 
of the experiences of 1946-51 relate to some large problems 
of contemporary international economic relations. Although, 
as I have said, the study of the period of European recon­
struction is far behind me, I also worked on some of the later 
phases of intra-European cooperation -- what might be called 
the period of self-propelled integration -- and on a number 
of aspects of broader international economic cooperation 
(or the lack of it). Some of these involve issues that arose 
in Europe in the late '40s and early '50s, some are involved 
in Europe's relations with the rest of the world, and some 
concern American foreign economic policy. What can be said 
about all these matters—  or any of them -- is bound to be 




























































































2. THE NATURE OF THE STUDY
I was conducting an inquiry, not testing hypotheses, let 
alone any general theory. I was trying to find out what was 
going on and what it might lead to. In that sense I was re­
porting, just as Michael Hoffman was reporting for The New 
York Times on the state of the European economy and Paul 
Hoffman •—  the head of the EGA1 (and no relation to Michael,
I believe) —  was reporting to Congress each quarter on what 
was happening in more or less the same range of activities. 
These other kinds of reports were immensely important to me, 
but my focus was different. It was on European cooperation, 
not all aspects of European recovery, and it stressed analysis. 
Both Hoffmans -- and others for whom we can let these two 
names stand — ■ also sought to analyze the cooperative pro­
cess; but for Michael, news had to come first, and Paul had 
to stress the relation of the facts he provided to the law 
Congress had made, the expectations that had developed and 
the commitments he had made in the past. None of these things 
was unimportant to me but my emphasis was different. My 
reporting was to show what we —  Americans and people gene­
rally had to understand; my analysis was an effort to 
advance that understanding, and the combined result was sup­
posed to let us know how our world was changing and permit
me and others to make suggestions that might have some 2favorable effect, currently or in the future. Often these 
suggestions would be recommendations about the policies of 
various governments, but they might deal with other matters 
as well.
On the assumption that people at the conference are familiar 
with the period, I have not spelled out all abbreviations 
or explained various organizations and activities. This 
can easily be done if there is any obscurity.





























































































The subtitle of the book is the key: A Study of Economic 
Cooperation. I put the same label on my later book on the 
Schuman Plan, partly to tie them together even though the 
later volume had turned out to be so different from the one 
I promised in Trade and Payments. In many ways the same sub­
title could have been put on much else that I have written. 
Consequently what I have said about not testing hypotheses 
is only partly true. As an inquiry proceeds, it suggests 
possibilities which become hypotheses to be tested, usually 
in relation to specific matters. Broader ideas about Western 
European cooperation were in the air and had to be examined. 
There is a good bit of this in the book, I find, and this 
seems natural enough. How else could one sensibly try to 
understand what was going on? This is, however, quite dif­
ferent from studying what was going on in Europe in order 
to determine, say, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
functionalist approach, how far market forces will tie econo­
mies together whatever the governments do, or when economic 
cooperation cannot work without some clearcut political 
understandings.
There can hardly be much mystery as to why international 
economic cooperation should have been a natural focus for 
such an inquiry. If I were to try to pin the matter down,
I would run the risk of boring you with an autobiographical 
account that would call attention to some passages in a 
high school essay on why national planning was inadequate, 
note the stimulus of certain studies in college and graduate 
school (including such curiosities as the relevance of some 
work on state and local government in the United States 
dealing with issues that spilled over boundaries), recount 
the intensive examination of a surprising number of relevant 
issues I had to undertake in my work for the War and Peace 
Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations and then touch 
on my small part in putting some ideas into practice in 




























































































None of this is necessary because the questions in my 
mind were a reflection of the age —  and of the years just 
past. We were all concerned about international economic 
cooperation because of its absence in the '20s and '30s. 
Although more than international cooperation was needed to 
overcome the evils of that period, it was hard to escape 
the conclusion that without more effective action in this 
field purely national solutions would prove inadequate even 
if broadly conceived. They would certainly be highly vul­
nerable to pressures making for mercantilism, protectionism 
and autarky and we had already paid a high price for that 
kind of world. National commitments to the elimination of 
depressions, full employment and greatly broadened concepts 
of social security might well sometimes seem to clash with 
international commitments, especially those removing barriers 
to trade and and payments, but the long run need was for 
ways of dealing with such problems —  and conceivably ending 
them. Governments should not be forced to choose one course 
or the other, especially since it was doubtful that any 
country could provide the levels of living democratic con­
stituencies demanded without some reasonable degree of inter­
national economic harmony.
For Americans, the issues were particularly sharp, since 
their country had held aloof from most of the prewar efforts 
at cooperation. One could hardly argue with any assurance 
that a different course of action by the United States would 
have made the League of Nations a success , prevented the rise 
of barriers to trade and payments in the Depression and be­
fore, and checked the rise of fascism. But the realistic 
possibilities raised questions and, at a minimum, the ab­
sence of the United States from these efforts could hardly be 
said to have helped (though there were some Americans who 
believed this). More important, it was clear that any future 
improvement in the climate for economic cooperation depended 
on the United States taking a major part in the process. As 




























































































could not be taken for granted ex ante. Why things worked 
out that way and how to appraise the American performance 
are matters that go beyond the scope of this paper, although 
they are not irrelevant to it. That is equally true of 
the reasons the efforts to deal with European recovery in 
the immediate postwar years proved inadequate and the Mar­
shall Plan was created.
There are, however, three basic points that must not be 
overlooked.
1) The entire American approach to rebuilding the world 
economy —  what became the Bretton Woods system—  was based 
on extensive international economic cooperation by all 
major countries, not least the United States^.
2) The cooperation called for was not simply formal or 
verbal. If there was any lesson from the interwar period 
that pertained specifically to cooperation —  and those 
lessons were guideposts for a great deal that was done —  
it was that governments could commit themselves to all 
sorts of general pledges —  as frequently happened under 
the auspices of the League of Nations —  without actually 
altering their behavior. That is one of the most important 
reasons the American proposals in finance, trade and other 
matters put so much stress on concrete commitments and inter-
4national organizations to oversee them .
3) The international economic system that the United 
States was advocating was to be global —  or at least as 
nearly global as was feasible. It was also multilateral, 
which meant that many countries took part, each having mul-
I have tried to explain why the cooperation of others was an essential ele­
ment in spite of the great power of the United States —  unless quite a 
different kind of system was to be created (see "The United States in the 
World Economy:A Fifty year Perspective" ,Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983,pp.81-104).
A second reason was the American constitutional system and 
the need to be able to demonstrate to Congress that there were 
firm commitments, rules for behavior and means of enforcing 
them,or at least penalizing infringements.Ironically,this was 
also one of the reasons some of the international commitments 
and agencies were not stronger.Congress was not prepared to 
live up its power on many matters or see the United States 
Pledged to courses of action that might prove onerous in the future —
y if one could not be entirely sure that other countries could 




























































































tiple relations with the others. Each conducted its own affairs 
autonomously so long as it met its obligations to others; 
equal treatment was the general principle but that did not mean 
that all relations were uniform. Although Western Europe was 
always regarded as a key factor in the system to be created, 
no particular emphasis was put on the cooperation of European 
countries with one another either in the process of recovery 
or later.
These three factors explain why a new emphasis on Western 
European economic cooperation, possibly even economic unifi­
cation, raised new problems. But they also help to explain 
my own approach to the question in 1947 when I began work on 
the book I am now reconsidering.
As I explained in the preface, I made my first postwar 
trip to Europe in the fall of 1947. The occasion, as for so 
many of my travels, was a conference; but the Council on 
Foreign Relations —  to which I had returned after several 
years in the government— wanted me to look around, make con­
tacts and explore the situation to see what kinds of work it, 
and perhaps I, should be doing in the future. I suspected I 
should learn more if I had some reasonably clearcut subject 
of inquiry, however broad, rather than walking into the office 
of some busy person and asking, "What is the situation in 
your country today?" The work of the past summer, generally 
spoken of as the European response to Secretary Marshall's 
speech, was on everyone's mind. The results were being pre­
sented in Washington while I was abroad; it was far from cer­
tain what Congress would do. Much depended on the size and 
validity of numbers; I had some doubts about those figures 
but even greater doubts that I could usefully contribute 
much to that debate —  or that I wanted to. But the emphasis 
on cooperation -- on Europeans working together -- first in 
Marshall's speech and then in the European response was a new 
element, potentially of enormous importance, frequently touch­
ing issues I thought I knew something about. It seemed a 




























































































plete conviction that my choice was based on a deep confidence 
of the future importance of European cooperation. Maybe it 
was but curiosity,convenience and luck played a large part.
I learned enough to think I should write a pamphlet to explain 
to the American public what the Europeans were doing in mat­
ters of cooperation. Things turned out otherwise and I did a 
lot more work. Probably that was just as well: How many of you 
would have found that pamphlet, 35, or more, years later?
From what I have already said you know why I approached 
the subject with skepticism. To start with, that is the right 
frame of mind —  or at least one of the right frames of mind
—  for scholarly inquiry. It is also my nature, especially 
when something new comes up —  ask my wife. I knew from my 
studies and my limited government experience how great the 
obstacles to cooperation were; they increase when governments 
are in difficulty even if that is when cooperation is most 
needed. For reasons that were in many ways perfectly "natural"
—  it seems odd that this term should be so understandable
in statecraft —  European governments, striving after recovery 
and each trying to do the best it could, acted as tough-minded, 
old-fashioned, nationalists. In the process they hurt them­
selves as well as others. But it was easy to see why they be­
haved this way. On the one hand, this behavior underlined 
what one already knew about the obstacles to effective inter­
national economic cooperation. On the other hand, it sowed 
an important seed of doubt about the language in the CEEC 
report about cooperation.
The authors of that report had had the "friendly advice" 
if I remember the terminology correctly —  of Under Secretary 
°f State William Clayton and the members of his mission during 
the summer of negotiating and drafting. In addition to under­
lining the importance of what Marshall had said about European 
cooperation, Clayton and the mission would undoubtedly have 
explained in clear and honest language how important this matter 
would be to Congress. Consequently, I, as an independent in­
quirer, had always to say —  to myself if not always my inter­




























































































that said to make the Americans happy while you know that 
later on one will find out that many things cannot usefully 
be done?
My approach was not hostile. The questions were real and 
honest; they deserved proper answers but it was not always 
easy for anyone to give them. Fortunately, my sense of the 
concreteness that real cooperation required —  the need for 
specific agreement on workable arrangements and not just 
statements of objectives, even if they were in perfect legal 
form -- provided a natural line of inquiry. When I asked what 
work had been done to discover the difficulties, who had 
proposed what solutions, what would have to be done to make 
them both economically effective and politically acceptable, 
and so on, the people I was talking with usually understood 
and we could find common ground. If occasionally there was 
none at all, that too helped give me some sense of what was 
being taken seriously and what not. My inquiry was based on 
other positive elements. I knew how important it was that new 
forms of international cooperation should be worked out if 
the world was to avoid the troubles of the "30s. I knew that 
it was possible for governments to act differently from the 
way they had in those times. I knew that there were people 
in Europe who took these matters seriously and, were working 
hard to make changes. I knew that quite objectively, the 
Europeans could do much more to help themselves than they 
were doing if they would cooperate more closely among them­
selves .
All this I might have said without rereading Trade and 
Payments but I should add one point as a result of that re­
reading: It turns out that I believed then — - as I have fre­
quently said in many different connections in recent years, 
and in between —  that however compelling the logic of al­
together consistent behavior -- x requires y, you cannot say 
a without saying b, etc. —  in real life it is not so. If 
one sees why a customs union should require an economic union 
or that a monetary union needs some merging of political so­




























































































problems that may force the integration of other sectors,one 
has hold of a fruitful set of ideas and an important analytical 
tool but one is not describing the real world —  except some­
times. And the determination of those times -- and what is 
then done —  is crucial to history but has not been a sound 
guide to policy. Ex ante one does not know either that this 
kind of development is inevitable or that illogical situations 
will not persist.
I have blown this point up into something too general for 
this paper. Its particular relevance to Trade and Payments is 
simply that my realization of this state of affairs —  not 
that it does not raise still further problems —  seems to 
me, in retrospect and on rereading to have saved me from 
dismissing any number of possibilities because they were 
"bound to fail" or as unwise because they were inconsistent 
with something else that was going on. Whether this understan­
ding predates my inquiry or mostly came out of it I cannot 
say with any certainty but I believe it was already there, 
though perhaps not altogether articulated, as a result of 
growing up in a highly pluralistic country.
I have allowed these last few pages to become too per­
sonal. This is more than you need to know. But I shall let 
them stand (as many other pages have not stood) because I 
think they give some clues to the way other Americans approached 
these matters. That record is mixed and I cannot go into it 
here. There are, however, two more points that are important 
to this rough sketch of the background and circumstances of 
Trade and Payments.
In the study of Western European economic cooperation 
American policy has an important place. The emphasis on coop­
tation was a new note in the Marshall speech; the subsequent 
record of American support for both cautious and bold mea­
sures of European integration leads one to think in terms of 
unqualified —  and perhaps sometimes unthinking —  American 
actions and attitudes. It is worth remembering, therefore, 




























































































were questions among informed Americans about it. Those of a 
certain period were reasonably well exemplified by the Council 
on Foreign Relations's Study Group on Aid to Europe, chaired 
by Dwight D. Eisenhower, when in December 1949 it discussed 
a paper by me that was in many respects an early version of 
Trade and Payments  ̂About half the discussion centered on 
whether it was wise for the United States to press hard for 
the "integration" Paul Hoffman had recently called for or 
whether there was too much danger of failure and disillusion.
The report of this discussion (Eleventh Meeting,December 20, 
1949) can be found in Archives of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Records of Groups, Vol. XXX; 1948-51, Aid to 
Europe, IV, 1.
In contrast to other reports that are in final form this 
one is marked "draft" and has minor corrections in my hand. 
Why this is so and whether a final version exists I do not 
know. In conformity with the rules of the Council's open 
archives, I have not mentioned the names of other 
participants who are alive as I have not yet asked their per­
mission to do so. - In
addition to the paper, the group had before it a short 
note by me in which recent quotations on key issues (by,e.g., 
Hoffman; Cripps, Geoffrey Crowther) were used to raise basic 
questions for discussion. Those not covered here concerned 
Britain's relation to the Continent, discrimination against 
the United States and cartels. The main paper, in a somewhat 
revised form, became chapter IX of Howard Ellis, The Econo­
mics of Freedom, 1950. There was some further discussion 
of some of these points when the group reviewed the book 
manuscript as a whole (largely on the basis of an oral sum­
mary of chapters on February 15, 1950. Same source; 14th 
meeting). The manuscript of Trade and Payments was never 
discussed in a study group so there is no comparable record. 
It drew on the work of several groups and was read in whole 
or in part by a number of people who gave me written or 
oral comments. As noted in the Preface, thanks to John H. 
Williams, the proofs were reviewed for factual errors by 
the research staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 




























































































Prominent among those urging caution were the economists : 
Jacob Viner, Ragnar Nurkse, Emile Despres, Howard Ellis, Stacy 
May, Percy Bidwell and Maxwell Obst. They were all acutely 
aware of the difficulties of overcoming deepgrained habits 
of national economic policy and of removing trade barriers. 
They had no doubt increased cooperation was desirable but 
how much was it realistic to expect the Europeans to adopt? 
They differed among themselves as to how great the gains 
would be from feasible measures of cooperation and whether 
there was a serious risk of incompatibility between such 
European measures and the pursuit of the measures of global 
economic cooperation which they all considered of major im­
portance. Had he been present, another member of the group,
g
The choice of the word "integration" for Hoffman's speech 
may well have reflected some of the same kinds of concern 
I am discussing here. "Unification" was a word American 
politicians favored and that word found its way into the 
Marshall Plan legislation. Many other Americans, including, 
I believe, most people in the State Department, thought it 
unwise to use so sweeping a concept especially since 
there was little manifest support for it in Europe. As 
I recall Miriam Camps's account of the matter, she thinks 
that some combination of State Department and EGA officials 
were able to put through the use of "integration" as some­
thing milder than "unification". The fact that the term 
had no commonly accepted content was helpful. Another 
consideration may have been that "unification" had clear 
political implications while it was an open question how 
much political cooperation was required for economic in­
tegration. Mr Hoffman's authority was for measures deal­
ing with European recovery and differences between him 
and the Secretary of State over foreign policy would have 
had to be settled by the President. Fritz Machlup's ad­
mirable book on the meanings integration has had in eco­
nomics is weak on this case.
Because this paper was finished while travelling I have 
had to rely on memory for certain points (as in the matter 
°f Miriam Camps's testimony) and some citations have 




























































































Russell Leffingwell, a Morgan partner, might well have said, 
as he did on several other occasions, "Cooperation is all 
very well but you can't improve Europe's balance of pay­
ments by adding up 18 deficits" —  or words to that effect.
The non-economists present had differing reactions. 
General Eisenhower began by saying that although one might 
question the expediency of Hoffman's remarks in the short 
run, "he was probably essentially correct on a long-term 
prognosis" and "asked whether there was any hope for Europe 
without integration" . Allan Dulles "wondered whether excep­
tionally strong principles were not vital to any program 
for greater intra-European cooperation". Otherwise each 
crisis would produce nationalist barriers. Other points made 
by members of the group were (1) that European advocates of 
integration wanted a strong emphasis on political measures;
(2) Europe could gain bargaining power by integration even 
if it entailed some economic costs; (3) the thing to do was 
to push ahead with military unification since the economists 
said economic integration would be so hard to get. Hamilton 
Fish Armstrong said it sounded to him as if no one thought 
economic integration would greatly affect the dollar gap 
and that was where we should concentrate our efforts. He 
"thought that the discussion led to the conclusion that 
overemphasis on integration would be a serious mistake....
If the public believes in the emphasis, failure might lead 
them to wash their hands of Europe". Eisenhower, who said he 
had always understood "that economic and military cooperation 
would have to be mutually supporting ..." now wondered if "a 
greater degree of political union was needed before a larger 
degree of economic union could be achieved". There should be
The text from which I am quoting does not purport to give 
verbatim statements, only summaries and paraphrases (but 
often the reporter uses the actual words as I know from 
having written many such documents) . It would not be wise 
to assume that the statements quoted necessarily represent 




























































































pressure lo that end; concern with politics and security 
might people give up old attitudes. He thought economic
integration "desirable even if there are doubts as /to7 ul­
timate benefits".
It would be interesting to pursue these matters further 
but I have had to take a pledge not to let your invitation 
to look back become an excuse to reminisce -- with documents 
if possible. There were many other longer and deeper dis­
cussions of American policy on European integration. Perhaps 
this summary has served the purpose of illustrating that 
some of the complexities of economic integration were re­
cognized in the United States and influenced my reasonably 
skeptical approach to the subject. At the level of policy, 
and particularly public discussion, matters were somewhat 
different —  and this could be a source of worry, as the 
quotation from Armstrong shows. There was also the danger 
of putting the United States in a position of insisting that 
the Europeans do things that could only last if the Europeans 
really wanted them (or came to want them). It may be ques­
tioned just how many voters thought very much about Western 
European economic integration but the Eisenhower group 
clearly thought there was strong public sentiment. It must 
be recalled, too, that it has long been a common American 
belief that part of the trouble Europe has had could be over­
come if "they" got together and formed a United States of 
Europe. And it was certainly true that cooperation among 
the European countries was generally regarded as essential 
to the success of the Marshall Plan in the discussion just 
referred to. If not, that was an important new conclusion 
said Eisenhower.
Many factors lay behind this judgement --starting with the ob­
vious one that part of Europe's trouble stemmed from the 
Persistence of nationalistic economic policies that restric­
ted trade and payments. Another was that any large-scale action 
by the United States would require Congressional action, at 




























































































ters as well« In the past the executive had repeatedly ap­
proached Congress for funds or other kinds of legislation 
connected with European recovery. Much had been premised as 
to what could be accomplished by the British loan because 
Britain was the center of the trading system and sterling 
a key to world financial and monetary order. There was a 
very real fear in the State Department, Treasury and White 
House that Congress would balk unless it was given some assu­
rance that this would be the last big approach and that it 
was different from what had gone before. The difference was 
to lie, to an important extent, in that all of Western 
Europe was pulling together, and that aid to one country 
would not have to be duplicated in another because each 
recipient was behaving as if it and the United States were 
alone in the world.
Hence the rather laconic passage on cooperation in Mar­
shall's speech. Hence the language in the CEEC's report of 
that summer. Hence my choice of cooperation as the theme 
to ask about on my first postwar visit to Europe.
This leads to my final point on the setting in which 
the book was written: Times change. In October 1947 when 
I made my first trip to Europe on this matter, the subject 
was new and there was all the uncertainty I have indicatedg
—  even whether there would be a Marshall Plan .By the time 
I wrote the paper for the Ellis volume, there was a great 
deal of activity in Europe and Hoffman had made the inte­
gration speech. By the time I finished the book, the announced 
period of the Marshall Plan was coming to an end, rearma­
ment was in train and raised questions about economic coope­
ration but also about political issues and the Schuman Plan 
had been announced and was under active negotiation. Atti­
tudes toward it included disbelief, hope, fear and the con­
viction that now Europe was really on the road to —  what? 
Should one say "integration", a word that was now fuzzier 
than when Paul Hoffman first defined it? Or perhaps "federa­
tion" a stronger concept but one that could be equally confu-
g — —--—--------------------------
The key issues were, of course, how much and what kind,so




























































































9sing? But what was equally clear was that the obstacles 
were still there. I was doing research for Trade and Payments 
in London during the week in which Monnet failed to convince 
the British of much of anything about what the French and 
Germans might do. Now we look back on these matters through 
a long period of the building up and then flattening out 
of European integration. In a way it is foolish not to let 
our judgment be influenced by what we know of how things 
have come out. But it is also useful to try, at least from 
time to time, to recapture the pristine view of the time.
Some of the reasons for this confusion, along with some 
other matters relevant to this paper, can be found in 
my essay, The Relevance of Federalism to Western European 
Economic Integration, in A.W. Macmahon (ed.), Federalism, 
Mature and Emergent, Columbia University Bicentennial 



























































































_ 20  _
3. SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTENTS
Robert Triffin once wrote a review of one of his own 
books in the book itself. I shall try nothing that ambitious. 
Here are only some reflections of a mixed character, stimu­
lated by rereading Trade and Payments for the first time in 
many years. They are put forward immodestly and with the 
artful omission of some points I want to make in the next 
section. I have varying degrees of conviction about these 
remarks and it would be of the greatest interest to me to 
find out how they strike others and what additions they 
would make.
First there are some omissions, whether they are sins 
or not. Japan does not appear in the book as it did not 
in the minds of those working in the Marshall Plan, I believe. 
What was going on in Japan had some things in common with 
what was being done in Europe. A link was made in Dean Ache- 
son's Cleveland,Mississippi speech about the two workshops 
of the world; but cooperation was not an issue in Asia.
East-west trade hardly appears, and is explicitly ruled 
out as a major subject. Partly, I suppose, that was because 
it raised quite different kinds of issues; perhaps more 
because it was not then a contentious issue of any great 
importance between the United States and Western Europe, 
as it soon became. I had pointed out in a Foreign Affairs 
article in 1948 that estimates of aid needs in Western Europe 
had made certain assumptions about goods from the east and 
if controls disrupted or restricted that trade some new fi­
guring would have to be done. I am not aware that it was 
done generally, but it must have been when the need came up 
in specific cases. A quite different east-west issue came to 
mind as I reread the section of Trade and Payments that deals 
with the first payments agreements and the problems of clea­
rings that required the assent of each participating country 
and why that was often withheld. The pattern was very similar 





























































































the aegis of the ECE which survived only a few years and 
did little. There are also overtones of the problems of trade 
within the CMEA. In some unpublished writing I have even spe- 
culated on what conditions would have to be created for CMEA 
to have its own equivalent of the EPU —  but I fear they 
involve very unlikely changes in the pricing and planning 
systems of those countries.
There is less in the book about Germany than I would 
have expected. To be sure, there is quite a lot about fit­
ting Western Germany into the new arrangements,' its crucial 
part in some matters and the way its payments crisis tested 
the EPU. But without those things the main story could not 
have been told. Why is there not more about the specific 
difficulties of the German situation and the complications 
and broad political and psychological aspects of its changing 
relations with the former enemies and occupied territories?
I was familiar with these problems (the conference that took 
me to Europe in 1947 was about Germany? I had worked on 
Germany and even on the trade problems resulting from the 
partition of the country). I have always shared the standard 
view that a major motive for building up a system of economic 
cooperation in Western Europe (and perhaps closer political 
cooperation as well) was to make a place where a democratic 
West Germany could live in reasonable harmony and confidence 
with its neighbors. Maybe I took all this for granted; maybe 
I simply thought the book was already too long. Some matters 
°f this kind came into the Schuman Plan book, naturally 
enough, but when I finished Trade and Payments I did not know 
that the next volume was going to be so firmly focused on 
the coal and steel pool.
The United States had a special concern with German mat­
ters —  some would say a bias. Robert Marjolin is very good 
on this tricky subject in his Leffingwell lectures of 1980̂ *"*.
Perhaps the size of the book and the oppressive process 
°f trying to finish it also explain the absence of any general
Robert Marjolin, Europe in Search of Its Identity,The Russell 
fingwell Lectures, Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y.,




























































































discussion of the interrelation of economic and political 
integration. Other people were writing about this all the 
time; in one way or another I took up the point when it 
came up in a context where limited discussion was all that 
was called for. I have never looked favorably on discussions 
that made a great thing of the differences between economic 
and political factors, perhaps because I got my main edu­
cation in the Great Depression when it would never have 
occurred to you to stress that distinction.
It is easier to see why the book says nothing about 
what most people would call a basic question: How much was 
economic cooperation contributing to European recovery?
That would quite simply have required another major study 
using different materials, tools and questions. I suspect 
it could not have been done with any degree of reliability 
at the time — - and I leave it to others whether it can now 
be done. Are there good, historical methods for disentangling 
multiple causes and complex effects? There is also a deeper 
reason. It is not altogether clear what cooperation is and 
when it occurs, the explanation cannot lie in forms alone. 
Adversarial processes that produce results accepted by all 
major parties are a kind of cooperation, but what if the 
struggle reduces the gains to be shared?
Considering the concern I had already shown about Ame-*- 
rican policy and the difficulties of encouraging European 
integration, it might have seemed natural to devote a greater 
portion of the book to this matter than I did and to look 
at the issues more systematically. At this distance in time 
I cannot say with great conviction why I did not do so, but 
I have some impressions. The active American role in propo­
sing, disposing, forcing issues to conclusions, providing 
aid on condition that the recipients do certain things, are 
strewn through the book. In that sense the subject is not 
neglected. In both this and the Schuman Plan book, I was 
stressing the fact that there were big chances afoot in Europe 




























































































influence than but probably not control them. Perhaps it could 
stop something from being done; only rarely could it carry 
through to a positive result. The message was: be careful, 
be thoughtful, be prudent, but here is what you should do.
At least I usually provided this last and if it was not 
there on an adequate scale in Trade and Payments, it may have 
been planned for the end of the second volume that then took 
a different shape.
Had I been writing history, I suppose I would have tried 
to say something in more detail. But then I would have run 
into a considerable obstacle: knowledge. I knew much of what 
went on; the world was full of newspapermen who knew -- or 
could find out —  more. But if you learn things from friends, 
there is the problem of confidence. And if you hear it from 
others, there is the question of reliability. And even when 
these can both be overcome, there is the issue of complete­
ness. Your story may be part of a much larger one; the se­
quence of events you know about may be only one of several 
parallel processes; the people involved in each thought 
they were on the track that would decide matters. Anyone 
who has even been in government knows what a difference there 
can be between the way something is supposed to happen —  or 
is seen to happen frcm the outside -—  and how it actually 
occurs. Anyone who has seen how administration and management 
take place knows how hard it is to be sure of what was done 
by the big name and what can be attributed to the administra­
tive assistant. Beyond these matters, I know I would have 
found myself troubled by trying to decide who had influenced 
whom and in what way. There are few relations as many-sided 
and elusive as those of influence.
It seems a pity we do not have more evidence of this 
kind of thing, but perhaps not. Considering the number of 
extraordinarily able and generally articulate people from 
so many countries who were involved in the Marshall Plan, 
it is surprising that we do not have a richer literature of 




























































































of mature reassessment, enlightening revelation, personal 
judgment of other people, and just plain gossip. Not that 
there are no serious and interesting issues to be examined. 
Robert Marjolin speaks of the great influence of the Ame­
ricans on the process of European integration coming at 
"the highest point of American power in the affairs of Europe 
and of the world". He says "the United States obliged the 
European countries to get together". There was an element of 
do ut des, but "the most spectacular development" was "when 
Averill Harriman announced to the O.E.E.C. Council that it 
must itself formulate recommendations to the American admi­
nistration as to the allocation of Marshall aid among the 
member countries"11. In other words, American influence 
often operated by trying to increase European responsibility.
The experience of others causes them to stress a diffe­
rent aspect. Albert Hirschman says his knowledge of France, 
Italy, and Germany in the '30s gave him "a natural concern 
and aversion when Marshall Plan administrators were aggressi­
vely pressing their views about appropriate domestic pro­
grams and policies upon countries such as Italy that were 
large-scale beneficiaries of aid. They did so for the best 
of motives ... but it was perhaps just because they felt thus 
unsullied by imperialist concerns that the aid administrators 
thought they were justified when they pursued their objectives 
in an imperious manner" 12.
Cited, pp. 17-21. It is important to remember, however, 
that Marjolin's basic argument goes well beyond American 
actions in such cases or even being "more European than the 
Europeans themselves" in support of "efforts ... to unify".
In addition, "America's influence was paramount" because its 
success seemed a model for Europe, its liberalism became a 
code of conduct, the dollar was the basis of the world mone­
tary system and the United States gave Europe unprecedented 
security so it could tend to its own development. (Quotations 
from pp. 14,13,14). There is also a question about the ex­
tent to which the United States, especially later on, accepted 
the European allocation without argument.
12 Albert Hirschman, A Dissenter's Confession: The Strategy of 
Economic Development Revisited, prepared for a symposium to 




























































































I recall, though, how often I was told that the national EGA 
mission in a certain country was more nationalist than the 
elected government or the local bureaucrats. And then in 
that country you would hear how little ERP headquarters in 
Paris understood about the special problems which had to 
be met. And Paris would naturally enough fight with Washing­
ton and it would require a deep knowledge of many things 
that probably no one had, to say who was really doing what 
for whom. The position in Germany was different again. Now 
that I have explained it all, I am rather glad I did not get 
myself trapped in trying to trace through these processes at 
the time —  interesting as some of the results may have been.
We come now to what may be sins of commission,issues I 
took up in the book but perhaps was wrong about. Rearmament 
is one. I remembered writing a chapter at a late stage, pro­
bably after most of the book was done. But I was surprised on 
rereading to find so many references throughout the book to 
the damage to cooperation likely to result from the new em­
phasis on arms. To be sure, it is easy to see why the idea 
of loading this kind of expense on a not-altogether-selfpro­
pelling and self sustaining European economy was troublesome 
and the concerns registered in the book about balances of 
payments, domestic investment or civilian consumption are not 
wrong. Neither are those that point to the fact that insofar 
as the European countries were not yet irrevocably tied into 
a process of economic cooperation among themselves -- except 
perhaps formally —  the national security argument provided 
an escape that was bound to be abused as well as to be hard 
to contradict1 . A second strain on European cooperation was 
that the United States was sure to be the main source of mili­
tary supplies and of whatever financial aid proved necessary, 
so it would once again be natural for any European govern- 
mont to deal with Washington instead of with its peers when- 
ever it could. There was no mention of the possibility that
In the discussion previously cited, Eisenhower had spoken of 
the strong tendency of national military establishments 




























































































military cooperation might improve the prospects of economic 
cooperation as the Cold War is often said to have done.
These arguments are not wrong, but was their effect ex­
aggerated? I suspect so, but I have not restudied the pro­
blem and cannot be sure. If anyone had asked me a few months 
ago, before I reread the book, what the main effect of the 
shift to rearmement had been on the Marshall Plan, I am 
reasonably sure that I would have said that as American arms 
aid had begun before normal Marshall aid was altogether com­
pleted, it had become hard to tell whether Marshall Aid had
lived up to all its plans. In complex economies resources
14are, to some degree, fungible . Certainly if one looks 
back now it is hard to see more than a minor frustration on 
the charted course of European cooperation that can be at­
tributed to the impact of rearmament. At least that is true 
of direct effect; it can certainly be argued that what I 
am here calling "rearmament", which required German parti­
cipation, tilted the scales in favor of such projects as 
the European Defense Community, the European Political Com­
munity and the Schuman Plan. Although only the last came 
into effect, the process —  leading later to the European 
Economic Community and Euratom -- put Europe on the road to 
a higher degree of economic integration than was likely to 
have resulted from the previous emphasis on trade and payments.
The other main fact was that,as we now know, Europe's economy 
was strong enough to take on some extra burdens and, proba­
bly, some further stimulus was involved in arms spending, 
especially as the United States provided a good bit of the 
financial support, at least for some time. Finally, what 
saved the day, at least in the short run, was the fairly 
quick deflation of the Korean war boon which had led the United 
States to stress the need for controls at a moment when the
I have discussed this issue in greater detail in a paper 
that I cannot now cite as I am writing away from my sources. 
This is true of a number of other issues touched on in this 
paper which I have written about,historically or otherwise, 
on various occasions without ever bringing all the points 




























































































element of liberalization was a major feature of European 
cooperation.
A rather remarkable example of the conflict between re­
armament concerns and the way European countries were guiding 
their recovery has recently come to my attention15. It com­
bines well known general factors and some specific activities. 
Decontrol and currency reform led to rapid growth in Germany. 
The Korean War caused a raw materials shortage and price 
rises. The United States led the way toward price ceilings 
and allocation to insure that materials were not used for in­
essential purposes and to limit the disruptive and inflatio­
nary pressures. Liberalized, growing Germany continued to 
absorb materials. The American authorities called for re­
straint and threatened (I think it is reasonable to say) not 
only a rationing of raw material supplies but the cutoff of 
aid. The Germans felt their whole approach through Sozial- 
marktwirtschaft was threatened and tried to get out of the 
difficulty by asking a committee made up of private business­
men to allocate raw material supplies so that the Americans 
got some assurance that the profligate use of scarce supplies 
would not continue while the German government was able to 
keep its hands clean and, as far as possible, its policies 
intact. Had I known of this exchange, I would certainly have 
cited it as evidence of the disruptive effect of rearmament 
(not a pure case, to be sure) and a threat to cooperation.
If this last is not clear, consider that this raw materials 
boom coincided with -- and of course contributed to —  the 
German EPU crisis. But the EPU authorities, following the re­
commendations of Cairncross and Jacobsson, stuck with the li­
beral line, eschewing controls. The American approach -- if 
the documents cited give a complete picture -- totally ignored 
the EPU, the OEEC and the whole dimension with which this paper 
ls concerned. Somewhere here there is a lesson; but what it 
ls I cannot tell without knowing more.
15Werner Abelshauser, Ansätze 'Korporativer Marktwirtschaft' 
fn der Korea-Krise der Frühen Fünfziger Jahre;Ein Briefwech­
sel zwischen den Hohen Kommissar JohnMcCloy und Bundeskanzler 





























































































It seems likely that the dissipation of the Korean raw 
materials boom would have more or less taken care of these 
problems. That would not have kept me from pointing to the 
German solution —  the private industry committee —  as one 
more example of the cartel-like activities that threatened 
to make public liberalization possible because private re­
strictions took over and prevented the shocks (and the gains) 
that would come from the kind of liberalization that increased 
competition —  which was assumed in the doctrine but not al­
ways evident in the practice. It would have joined company 
there with what I think, on rereading, amounts to a fairly 
impressive list of cases in which the natural instincts of 
businessmen to suppress competition —  unless they can beat 
out the pack -- threatened to frustrate the effort to increase 
Europe's efficiency and competitiveness by enlarging the in­
ternal market. Nor was I alone in my concern with the cartel 
problem, as several references in the book show. The issue 
was on all of our minds as the result of interwar experience.
We made a first effort to deal with it internationally in 
the ITO. It was a subject of concern in occupation policy 
in Germany and Japan. Measures to foster competition were 
written into the Marshall Plan legislation.
Then, somehow, the cartel issue seems almost to disappear. 
What happened? I am not sure. Was the whole thing an American 
illusion? Did the antitrust approach take sufficient root 
in Europe so that new laws —  as in Germany and Britain —  
held back businessmen? Or did restrictive practices go on 
more or less as before? As the book points out, evidence in 
these matters is hard to come by. Maybe the private business 
agreements helped make the removal of barriers within the 
Community less troublesome than was expected. Were they, in 
some sense, the vehicle for the development of that intrain­
dustry specialization which has supposedly been such a benign 
factor in making Community "free trade" both productive and 
non-disruptive? In contrast, did they contribute to preventing 




























































































—  and a competitive one —  and thus also play a part in the 
decline of the separate national steel industries? Or did 
the cartel-making tendencies lose their force, either because 
times were good and entrepreneurs could gain more by Schum­
peter ' s creative destruction than by risk aversion? Perhaps 
it was the extensive removal of official trade barriers -- 
always the strong right arm on which cartels depended -- and 
the expansion of the area of competition that put a ceiling 
on the cartel movement. Without any doubt the great growth 
of international direct investment (one aspect of the growth 
of truly multinational enterprises) made it difficult if not 
impossible to organize cartels that would pay. Raymond Ver­
non —  who at the time I am writing about was a key figure 
in the State Department's work on international business prac­
tices and, I believe, wrote some of the warnings about the 
Schuman Plan —  has since shown very well how the world eco­
nomy has shifted from one with many private ententes toward 
one dominated by global competition, albeit often oligopolis­
tic. That suggests that still other problems lie ahead of us, 
as I believe to be the case, but this is not an essay on 
future problems. The basic question for the past is "What 
happened?" I hope that some historians will tell us 16
Customs unions occupy a surprisingly large place in my 
book. That is partly because I did serious work on Benelux 
and read the documents about Francital (who remembers that 
acronym?) and the other efforts and that was more than most 
people did. Customs unions were something new to students of 
current economic policy. Everybody knew about the Zollverein, 
but that was history, and the conventional wisdom was that 
almost no countries were likely to form a customs union except 
if very small ones attached themselves to others (like Luxem­
bourg and Liechtenstein) or if there was a dominant partner, 
as Prussia had been. The customs union provisions in GATT and 
the ITO were there because customs unions were conventional
16Perhaps this has already been done. Remember what I said 
earlier about my not having kept up with the period. I 




























































































exceptions to MFN and it seemed like a good idea to have some 
rules for them, not because people expected Europe to form one.
How does it happen then that the United States became an 
advocate of a European customs union —  if that in fact was 
what Clayton's "friendly advisers" suggested to the Europeans 
in the summer of 1947? To be sure, a key issue in moving from 
the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution in 1789 had 
been internal free trade and a common tariff but one could 
hardly call the United States with its strong central govern­
ment a customs union. Perhaps others have turned up interes­
ting material unknown to me but otherwise I suspect two simple 
points explain the matter. In general terms the Americans were 
looking for broad, loose examples of some long run target of 
cooperation —  though I feel sure they really did not mean to 
tell the Europeans how they had to organize themselves. More 
concretely and immediately, the Americans were making it clear 
that they would flatly resist preferential tariff arrangements 
as a satisfactory response to Marshall's call for cooperation; 
they suspected, and probably rightly, that this was one of 
the first kinds of cooperation that would commend itself to 
the Europeans.
Then the well-known question arose, whether the Americans 
were logical in favoring what could be called 100 per cent 
preferences but not lesser ones. The arguments are all laid 
out in Trade and Payments; the background of this attitude 
in the United States need not be gone into here. Not many 
Europeans wanted to have a customs union for the whole area.
But in the very special circumstances of Western Europe, with 
all sorts of activity on trade and payments under way, cus­
toms unions — - and their cousins, free trade areas — - were 
bound to come into clearer focus and be seriously considered. 
Was it sensible then for me to say —  in what must be one of 
the flattest statements in the book —  that a European customs 
union was about the least likely outcome of the efforts to 
cooperate? To those for whom the European Community is a long- 




























































































more than a customs union) that must look like an awful how­
ler. Perhaps it was. It is partly a question of how far ahead 
I was looking and that is not at all clear to me now, I have 
no interest in trying to defend this old judgment. Still, 
much time passed before the Common Market was formed; it in­
cluded six nations not all Europe; they said they were for­
ming more than a customs union: and they were building on an 
older piece of quite radical sectoral integration. Most people 
even thought the next sectoral step, Euratom, was more impor­
tant than the Common Market. So this later experience really 
raised two questions discussed in Trade and Payments: How far 
toward economic union did governments have to go to make 
customs unions work? Would unions of a few countries become 
building blocks or stumbling blocks for all European activity? 
I am inclined to say that those questions have not altogether 
been disposed of. Time has, however, certainly supported the 
book's judgment that although there was a logical case for 
saying that a customs union would only work satisfactorily 
if it led to a full economic and probably political union,
"it is reasonable to suppose that a customs union could be 
formed that might be operated for a long time on some basis 
short of this" (p 401). But a long time is not forever.
I am inclined to leave the matter like that. One might 
note, though, that a good bit of this customs union story 
could be told in terms of the United Kingdom. There was much 
of the validation for my statement of how unlikely a Europe­
wide customs union was. On quite a few other issues some­
thing similar is true. The book makes this clear and devotes 
quite a bit of attention to Britain at many points —  more 
than I remembered. But should it have dug deeper into the 
roots of British attitudes and the problems of the British 
economy —  and of foreign policy? Would there have been any 
clues to help us understand the next decade? Was there any­
thing that might have been done in this period that would have 
altered the British approach? There was still some kind of 
special relation with the United States and it occasionally 




























































































man and Cripps and the drawing rights touched on on p.67) .The 
two governments were often enough on opposite sides and not 
very happy with one another; expectations and perhaps some 
relations had soured with the convertibility provisions of 
the loan agreement that was to have played such a key part 
in global economic reconstruction- But they still worked 
together on many basic matters; the British saw themselves 
as still a global economic power in a sense that no Conti­
nental country was (though the French sometimes made this 
claim for themselves vis-a-vis the other , Continental coun­
tries mostly because of colonies). I find that it is not 
always realized how much the American picture of a liberal 
multilateral postwar world economy assumed that Britain 
would play a key role not too different from that of the past. 
The realization that this was not to be came piecemeal, I 
believe, but I have not been able to reconstruct the process 
for this paper. Certainly, quite a few people in both coun­
tries had to be aware of the new situation before govern­
mental approaches could change. But in these early days, 
possibilities seemed open; part of the American crossness 
with a number of British decisions was, I think, stirred by 
what seemed to be the unwillingness of the British to do 
things that were within their power if they would only take 
more risks and alter some of their ways of looking at things.
There was even the possibility —  I do not think it 
was an American plan or proposal but the idea existed —  that 
Britain could lead the process of European cooperation and 
that that would mean that —  for some time at least —  Bri­
tain would be the leader of the new Europe that was bound to 
emerge. That this would have been a different Europe from 
the one that we have known goes without saying. But could 
there have been that kind of British leadership, in 1945 or 
1945 or 1947 or even later? "We were many in France and in 
the other European countries who were ready to accept it; who 






























































































Let me close this rather long section with the mention 
of one more topic. I was pleased on rereading to find it was 
not only a prominent theme in the book but one that was set 
forth clearly and with what I still think was about the right 
emphasis. I am referring to the interplay of Western European 
economic cooperation and Europe's place in the world economy. 
The issue was very important at the time and I think still is. 
Earlier in this paper I spoke of the efforts to create a glo­
bal, multilateral system of economic cooperation and of the 
question whether cooperation confined to the countries of 
western Europe would be compatible with progress on a wider 
front. That was not just a question of technical matters, such 
as how to relate discriminatory trading arrangements to GATT 
and the ITO, or what degree of currency transferability could 
exist at different levels. It was a question of what would 
happen to the Western European economies. If they were shel­
tered from international competition would they become weaker 
instead of stronger? If it was easier to meet payments in 
European currencies than dollars, would that perpetuate incon­
vertibility? All these matters are laid out in the book and 
I have nothing to add to them. There were serious doubts in 
many parts of the US government about these matters and the 
doubts gave rise to quarrels as is likely to happen in bureau­
cracies. No doubt there were more vivid tales than I told as 
I had only the external appearance to go on; now the documents 
should be available and I hope historians are seeing what they 
can find. There are also still quite a few of the participants 
around who can surely be persuaded to talk if not to write. 
Perhaps that is all adequately taken care of -- as I said ear- 
-*'der, I am no longer well informed on these matters.
More important than victory for those with confidence in 
the European economy is that it looks as if the gamble had 
been won, insofar as it was a gamble, in American policy. The 
disappearance of the EPU shows that the creation of the EPU 




























































































led to their being removed (for the most part) ; the Community 
was able to contribute to the success of the Kennedy and 
Tokyo Rounds of trade liberalization. There are, to be sure , 
questions about what the codes on subsidies and other matters 
worked out in the Tokyo Round will amount to and the European 
attitude will be crucial in these matters, but the difficul­
ties do not stem primarily from the processes started in the 
late '40s and early "50s. So far as I can see, much the same 
obstacles to dealing efficiently with nontariff barriers 
arise within the Community, though they can be handled some­
what differently there.
If this paper had been written around 1970, one would have 
added with confidence some words about European industry's 
success in world markets as a demonstration that no harm had 
been done by the period of shelter from international com­
petition and discrimination against the United States. Today 
it would be difficult to make flat and sweeping statements 
about that competitiveness. But I think it would be equally 
difficult to lay the blame on events in the past we are tal­
king of — - or at least the principal blame. When it comes to 
agriculture, matters are quite different —  in fact, they are 
so different that I cannot enter into the matter now. In 
Trade and Payments, I find many clues to our present plight. 
Even then there was talk of a green pool and the line to the 
CAP is clear enough. I remember very well saying to our then 
Ambassador to the Communities, "Do we really have to support 
these efforts so strongly? There is nothing the Community go­
vernments can agree on in agriculture that will not cause 
trouble for the United States". Americans of a certain age 
should understand these matters if they paid attention to their 
own farm policy. The CAP measures are in some ways more ele­
gant than anything ever achieved in the United States; but the 
basic politics and the economic consequences do not differ so 
much from place to place. It is the Europeans who pay, natu­





























































































I will add one piece of evidence about how basic to Ame­
rican policy and thinking was the relation of European coop­
eration to global cooperation. During the war, a number of 
ideas about Europe and sometimes rather elaborate proposals, 
were discussed by Americans concerned with the postwar settle­
ment. Apart from the merits of schemes for building electrical 
grids (sometimes with the aim of making Germany dependent 
on outside controls), a TVA for the Danube, federations in 
the Balkans, single corporations to administer European trans­
port and, of course, customs unions, there were seen to be 
larger questions. On July 13, 1942, at a meeting of the 
Economic and Financial Group of the War and Peace Studies 
Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, Winfield Riefler, 
a gifted and experienced economist who had much influence al­
though he published little, said that in discussing such mat­
ters "we should keep a clear distinction in our mind between 
unifying Europe behind some kind of barrier, and breaking 
down the barriers within Europe". In the discussion that fol­
lowed, some interesting points were made which, if I were 
writing history, would have to be set out and discussed. "The 
Research Secretary was instructed to prepare a brief memoran­
dum ...". I did so in time for the next meeting on August 10.
There was another discussion from which the following ex­
tract is of interest: Benjamin V. Cohen, one of President 
Roosevelt's most influential advisers and one of the few 
early New Dealers to take a key interest in foreign affairs 
later on (he became Counsellor of the State Department under 
Secretary Byrnes) said that he "felt uncomfortable at the 
idea of the United States standing against the creation of a 
bloc not much more autarkic than we ourselves are. There are 
advantages for the Europeans in the large market even if they 
have a high tariff against the rest of the world. One has mis­
givings in saying that it is dangerous for others to be in 
the same position as the United States. Mr Riefler thought 
these worries less serious than the alternatives of an armed 




























































































The memorandum was held over. About a month later, on Septem­
ber 14, 1942 it was approved (I imagine there had been some 
further informal discussion but have no record of it) .
The final text focused on the issues of trade and au­
tarky and stressed the difference between the breaking down 
of barriers within Europe —  which was essential to European 
unification and would be economically beneficial —  and the 
kind of barriers to trade with the rest of the world this 
Europe would have, where there were some serious alternatives. 
High barriers would make for autarky, be economically costly 
to Europe and "always be a potential danger to the United 
States. It would be a concentrated power unit which might be 
seized by another Hitler or some other power hostile to this 
country and made the basis of an aggressive war machine".
The paper concluded:
The United States should favor economic unifi­
cation of Europe only if steps are taken to avoid the 
creation of an autarkic Continental economy. Positive 
American policy should aim at the interpenetration of 
Europe's economy with that of the rest of the world, 
as well as a lowering of economic barriers within Europe.
To be successful in this course, the United States must 
work for the reduction of trade barriers against European^ 
goods throughout the world, including the United States.
By the time of the Marshall Plan, no one was thinking much 
about European autarky or an undue concentration of power in 
Western Europe. More to the point might have been a remark 
by Alvin Hansen, the leading American Keynesian, not often 
given to large pronouncements on international politics, who 
at the July 13, 1942 meeting, "reminded the Group that the
USSR would have to be considered. It is conceivable we would 
want a strong Continental European bloc to check that country".
Council on Foreign Relations. Studies of American Interests 
in the War and the Peace.Economic and Financial Series. No.
E-B 56. American Interests in the Economic Unification of Europe 
with respect to Trade Barriers;September 14,1942/mimeographed. 
This collection of papers has been in the public domain since 
about 1946 and can be found in some 50 libraries,mostly in 
the United States.The quotations from the discussions were made 
public much more recently and can be found in the Archives of the Council 
on Foreign Relations in documents with similar series titles to those of 




























































































But I do not think that this old memorandum was very much on 
people's minds during the global-regional debate of 1947-51; 
I did not think of it myself when I wrote my book. In part 
that may have been because the basic ideas, and especially 
the economic ideas, were so widely accepted by Americans 




























































































4. THEN AND NOW
NOTE TO READERS: As time was short to finish this paper while 
travelling, I left this section to the last. It would be al­
most certain to take up any time available because it concerns 
major current issues, the unfinished business of international 
economic cooperation. Many of these are matters on which I 
have worked in recent years so I am always tempted to lay 
them out in detail even though I have written about them in 
other places. Just how they can be linked to the experience of 
Western European economic cooperation in the period of recon­
struction is often a complex matter and there is a question 
whether such links should be forged at all. That,' too, encou­
rages discursiveness. It was clear there would not be the time 
needed to work through all these matters and then condense 
the exposition to a decent length. In the end, the reader has 
been spared because time ran out. The best I have been able 
to do is to raise about half a dozen points without saying 
much about them. What you find is almost a series of telegrams 
with roughly parallel organization. First I state what seems 
to me to be a major current problem. Then I comment briefly 
on some of its key aspects. Finally, I ask —  or suggest —  how 
it relates to the period covered by Trade and Payments. The 
method is not likely to settle much, but it should provide a 
basis for discussion.
1. At least since the end of the Kennedy Round it has 
been clear that the major factors blocking or distorting in­
ternational trade outside the developing countries were the 
so-called non-tariff barriers and related government practices 
concerning subsidies, preferential government procurement, etc. 
The Tokyo Round made significant progress in drawing up a 
number of codes for dealing with these matters but their real 
significance remains to be seen; they will be what governments 
make them. The old methods of reciprocal bargaining to remove 
(or tolerate) barriers that served well for the reduction of 
tariffs and the removal of quotas have only limited applica­
tion to the new problems. Initially, one sees little in the 
OEEC and Marshall Plan experience that would help very much; 
as in more general negotiations, NTBs etc. were left largely 
out of account because the familiar and more visible barriers 
had to be dealt with. There may, however, be something useful 
in two lines of inquiry, (a) In the setting of European re­



























































































economic policies and its foreign trade and payments was 
generally recognized. This is a key element in dealing with 
many subsidies and other practices (including various aspects 
of national industrial policies) and is one that does not 
find as general acceptance as will be necessary if traditional 
trade negotiating arrangements are to become capable of dea­
ling with these barriers, (b) In the parts of the European 
experience that I did not study as closely as the liberali­
zation of trade and payments, such as relating national in 
vestment programs and other recovery measures to one another, 
how much attention was paid to the future trade consequences 
or, for that matter, to the kinds of national measures that 
ought to be called for to make the new industries viable 
without competition? The general impression has been that 
there was no great success in these matters; if so, is that 
in itself significant, as a warning or lesson? Even if there 
was no general success, are there instances of these matters 
being handled in such a way as to give us some clue as to 
what might be done nowadays?
2. Many contemporary international economic problems are 
expressed in terms of the difficulties of particular indus­
tries or sectors —  textiles, steel, automobiles, shipbuil­
ding. National industrial policies often single out certain 
industries and major government programs frequently concern 
only one industry. There are many deficiencies in this ap­
proach, especially since basic troubles often reside in the 
relation of one industry to the rest of the economy. It is 
easy to see, though, why matters are handled this way and 
will continue to be. In the OEEC (and related GATT activities) 
the approach to trade matters was across-the-board, permitting 
the traditional kind of bargaining in which a country opened 
its markets to certain products in return for better access 
to foreign markets for quite different products. Subsequently, 
a sectoral emphasis in international trading arrangements has 
usually meant extracting the industry, or its products,from 
the normal processes of trade liberalization: agriculture, 




























































































steel and automobiles, as well as many less important pro­
ducts that for some time are subjected to special arrange­
ments that restrain trade to mitigate competition. This has 
to be seen as the deterioration of the system, not the sub­
stitution of something better. However, it has long been 
argued that it should be possible to make agreements about 
individual industries or sectors that would combine temporary 
protection with adjustment measures, burden sharing arrange­
ments and the like that would produce mutual economic ad­
vantages in the end while making the processes of- change 
politically and socially acceptable. Or, it has been argued, 
by looking at the structure and interrelations of an industry 
in several countries it should be possible to work out arran­
gements that improve the division of labor , raise producti­
vity, avoid wasteful duplication in investment and cope with 
common problems more efficiently. These arrangements were 
not unkown in Europe during the recovery period; they found 
a place in some discussions of functionalism, in ideas about 
transport, in the Stikker Plan which is discussed in Trade 
and Payments and then in the Coal and Steel Pool and the 
CAP. But there is not much evidence that that experience 
has provided helpful models for contemporary problems. Or 
are there aspects that have escaped my attention? A few 
items have spilled over? Stikker called for a European In­
tegration Fund to help finance structural change; on July 20 
of this year the Commission of the European Communities
sent a communication to the Council on "Increasing the ef-
19fectiveness of the Communities' Structural Funds" . But the 
industrial world's record in these matters is not very good. 
Probably the disappearance of the Stikker Plan was mainly 
the result of the concentration on the Schuman Plan, but 
maybe it was also the result of explorations that showed 
how complex the integration of any important sector might be. 
Perhaps it exemplified a point a French minister of industry 
once made to me, that governments are unwilling to act in­
ternationally on such matters until the situation is very 
difficult. And we know what happens if cooperation comes




























































































only in dealing with industries that are sick in all countries.
3. Whether one speaks of common purposes or the suffi­
cient satisfaction of the needs and interests of enough 
individual countries to keep them engaged, cooperation de­
pends on the willingness of governments to adapt their actions 
to certain standards or rules. There appears to have been a 
considerable decline of this willingness among leading coun­
tries over a considerable period of time, probably dating 
since the late '60s. One can make good arguments as to why 
it would be very damaging to let this process continue and 
why there should be a broader recognition of the national 
interest these countries have in preserving an international 
economic system that relies heavily on cooperation. It is, 
hovever, far from clear that this recognition is likely
to take place or lead to sufficient changes in behavior to
20stop the process . At the time of the Marshall Plan, the 
common interest of the Western European countries in reco­
very and in American aid was plain enough. Even so, it 
seems to have required some pressure from the United States 
to get the cooperative processes to the point at which they 
made some serious contribution to the economic welfare of 
all the countries and, eventually, became self-sustaining.
There is no such external pressure on the main industrial 
countries now. Does that mean that the earlier experience is 
wholly irrelevant? Or can it be argued that the earlier pe- 
riod shows that even at a late stage of a problem, if there 
is a sufficient perception of a threat, unprecedented efforts 
will be made —  in that case in the United States as well as 
Western Europe —  that have a good chance of reinvigorating 
cooperative processes? In the earlier case it was not reinvi- 
lorating but creating the cooperative processes. Was that 
Perhaps easier than what is called for now? One disadvan- 
iaSe of the present situation is that we have lived so long
I have discussed this process at greater length in the 




























































































with a cooperative system that much is taken for granted by 
people who do not realize how much attention these activities 
require to remain in working order. A second disadvantage 
is that the imperfections and inadequacies of the system 
get more attention than what it accomplishes and this breeds 
cynicism, a sense of injustice, and a feeling that when 
necessary one is entitled to make exceptions to the rules 
on one's own behalf since that is what others do- At the 
earlier time, there was worry about embarking on unfamiliar 
commitments but there was no record of weakness to focus 
on (except in what was being done without the cooperative 
arrangements) and there was sometimes hope. Or does the a- 
symmetry of the American-European relation in the Marshall 
Plan period make its "lessons" —  if any —  irrelevant to 
the present problems of cooperation among a number of eco­
nomically strong units? What weight do the current asymme­
tries of military power have in this matter?
4. A serious difficulty in showing why it is important
to preserve the cooperative system is that that system, as
it has been, is plainly inadequate to deal with many of
the major problems facing governments. GATT has not been
given jurisdiction, much less power, wide enough to cope with
21all the trading problems that have accumulated . Although 
the International Monetary Fund seems to have gained support 
and strength in dealing with the debt crisis of developing 
countries, its voice in the affairs of the richer countries 
is still quite limited and their existing monetary arrange­
ments are clearly deficient. (Reference to international 
organizations is just shorthand; these bodies are intergovernmental
and the major governments have not been willing to work through them or around 
then in these matters).
The world was not full of free traders in 1947 but the 
argument that removing barriers to trade and payments was
Yl These problems, the weaknesses of the trading system and 
what might be done about them are examined in Miriam Camps 





























































































essential to European recovery (and maximized European self- 
help) did not necessarily lead to the indefinite continuation 
of liberalization, much less free trade. So there could be 
agreed action without commitments concerning the ultimate 
state of affairs. The world is not full of free traders in 
1983 but trade, at least among industrial countries, is 
much freer than it has usually been. The relatively low le­
vels of tariffs do not tell the whole story, however, since 
there are not only clearcut nontariff barriers and the assor­
ted quantitative restrictions referred to above but also 
any number of governmental measures that affect the pattern 
of world trade, whether they bear directly on trade or in­
vestment, the structure and operation of the national economy 
or, sometimes, fiscal matters. Most governments follow se­
lective policies in trade and often combine them with mea­
sures that can be summed up as industrial policies which 
seek to resist change, adapt to it, or bring it about.
This combination of circumstances not only overflows the 
past cooperative system, as was suggested above, but makes 
it very difficult to find common standards on which govern­
ments can agree. Further complicating matters are diffe­
rences among countries in the actual, acceptable and hoped- 
for place of the government in the economy; this affects 
concepts of fairness in trade, of competition, of the way 
government-owned enterprises should conduct themselves and 
of the usefulness of trade rules based on the assumption 
that government intervention in the economy, ipso facto, raises 
the question of fair trade (and if trade is not in some sense 
fair", it is not clear why it should be freed or the resul­
ting foreign competition adapted to -- at least according 
to neoclassical economic theory).
It seems to be stretching a point to worry whether the 
Marshall Plan experience is relevant to all this but there 
is one thought that may be worth some attention. The trade 
and payments measures of the period we are talking about 




























































































had to be justified in terms of their contribution to reco­
very (or specific aspects of it). Although one might expect 
foreign competition to strengthen an economy, no one would 
push for a degree of liberalization that left that country 
with an unmanageable trade balance. There are no such 
common objectives today but up to a point it can be argued 
that the application of the subsidies code, for example, 
may have to focus on the results of various actions for a 
number of countries rather than either the form or the amount 
of the subsidy (by rough analogy with tariffs). This is 
obviously neither an adequate substitute for all trade libe­
ralization objectives nor a standard that lends itself to 
clear prescriptions and criteria. Perhaps it cannot be ap­
plied in general but only to cases. It may not even be worth 
pursuing.
5. It is not only the international economic system that 
has altered since 1950. National economies, especially those 
of the industrial countries, relate to one another in quite 
different ways from what was assumed in the thinking that 
went into the Bretton Woods system. All the well-known fac­
tors that are summed up by "interdependence" make for some­
thing quite different from "international"economic relations. 
The ability of governments to do some things on a national 
basis has decreased; this has not often led them to pool 
resources and sovereignty to regain power on an international 
basis, which was one of the underlying arguments for European 
integration. The costs of trying to regain freedom by redu­
cing interdependence vary greatly from country to country.
The United States is not nearly as protected against the 
pressures of interdependence as it used to be; the "interna­
tional sector" of the country is far larger than is often 
realized. In Europe the situation is complicated by different 
degrees of inderdependence: within the Community; the Com­
munity with the world; individual countries with the world.
It can be argued that interdependence is reversible because 





























































































strong governments can keep the support of their people in 
making economic sacrifices to limit interdependence in the 
interests of gaining a freer hand to do certain things.
This seems like a good subject for historians since, muta- 
tis mutandis, this kind of thing has happened before. But 
do we get any help from the Marshall Plan experience? The 
aim of Western European cooperation then was to increase 
interdependence for the sake of the economic gains it would 
yield. There was opposition on national grounds and sometimes 
the objection was that a government's hands would be tied 
when they ought to be free (as in some customs union dis­
cussions) or that concentrating on European cooperation 
risked losing the advantages of action in the wider world 
(Britain on some matters). The contrasts with now seem to 
be stronger than the similarities.
5. As the last few sections have shown, it is questio­
nable how useful it is to try to find links between the ba­
sic problems of today and the experience of European coop­
eration in the Marshall Plan years. I shall, therefore, 
simply raise a few more issues and leave them for others 
to work out.
The Marshall Plan was based on the belief that Western 
Europe could be a strong factor in the world economy but 
only after its recovery had been carried much further than 
it appeared to be in the bad winter of 1946-47. Then coope­
ration was seen as a necessary condition for recapturing 
this strength. After the Marshall Plan, the self-propelled 
European integration was generally regarded as likely to 
contribute to the strength of Europe's position in the world, 
this seems to have happened but an ambiguity arises as to 
whether this strength is based on the Community acting as 
a unit or on the economic strength of member countries. Only 
Part of that strength comes from European integration. Most 
°f the Community countries are also deeply involved in the 




























































































contribute to their economic strength. Except when there are 
clear-cut advantages resulting from differences in the way 
members of the Community treat one another and how they 
treat the rest of the world, it may be hard to know how much 
comes from one source and how much from another. The slowing 
down of integration in recent years seems to be linked some­
times to the unwillingness of members of the Community to 
give up their ability to handle some relations with the 
rest of the world on a national basis and sometimes on un­
willingness to accept sharper competition within the Commu­
nity or to lose powers over elements of national industrial 
policy. It would seem to be a question of history to clarify 
these points which are also full of implications for the 
way contemporary problems can be dealt with.
7. With regard to contemporary problems, it is probably 
well known that the Community is widely regarded in the 
rest of the world —  perhaps I should confine my remarks 
to the United States, but it goes further -- as much more 
likely to be negative than positive when new measures of 
international cooperation are proposed and, in general, to 
find it easier to say "no" than "yes". Those who study the 
Community's decision-making and negotiating processes ex­
plain matters in these terms but also report that what is 
done is heavily colored by the political relations among 
members of the Community. A second source of negativism is 
the difficult situation all countries have been in in recent 
years. But there seems to be something more, a sense that 
there are deep, longrun factors that will lead Europe to 
resist anything like further trade liberalization —  or the 
broader kinds of understandings I have suggested are necessary. 
Behind this feeling are a number of factors. There are all 
the forces that try to preserve the status quo or their own 
position. But it is argued that Europe can better adapt to 
the changing world economy if it can limit foreign competi­
tion while it effects the changes in its own industries that 




























































































suggests that competition with Asia —  or eventually the 
whole Third World -- is incompatible with the preservation 
of Europe's economic and social values and so must be con­
trolled indefinitely, That raises the question whether 
there is sufficient dynamism in the European economy to ini­
tiate, and sufficient competition to sustain, the changes 
that will be necessary to keep the Western European economy 
as productive as the people of Western Europe will want it 
to be. Those who answer this question affirmatively usually 
rest their case on the size and diversity of the European 
economy and on the attractions it offers foreign investors 
and sellers of technology. There are overtones here of the 
debate about a protected Europe becoming uncompetitive in 
the early '50s. But are there enough similarities to make 
this a useful comparison?
8. Obviously, the United States is in a different position from that of 
Marshall Plan days.The main points are too well known to need repeating;
the range of possibilities is too complex to go into here.
A few flat statements -- tilted toward the broader subject 
of this paper —  sum things up. The United States is in 
no position, economically or psychologically, to accept 
with equanimity any largescale and continuing measures by 
other industrial democracies that seem to discriminate against 
it in damaging ways. A sensible American policy will press 
for a reinvigoration of international economic cooperation; 
with as much emphasis on the extension of cooperation as 
on the reinforcement of existing arrangements that have ero­
ded and weakened. There are strong forces in the United 
States working against such an approach. How far the United 
States will, in the end, go in this direction depends to an 
ittportant degree on what other leading industrial countries, 
totably Japan and those of the European Community, are willing 
to do. The sense of frustration and unfairness that fueled 
the unilateral actions of 1971 that threatened to undermine 
the whole system of international economic cooperation are 





























































































9. Although part of the story of the success of Western 
European cooperation in the Marshall Plan period involves 
its proving to be largely compatible with the system of 
multilateral cooperation that has been built up, the general 
issue is not altogether a thing of the past. The difficul­
ties encountered .n recent years in se'curing effective mul­
tilateral cooperation, at least among the whole range of in­
dustrial countries, have raised the question whether a few 
countries —  perhaios sometimes only two —  might not find 
ways of dealirg effectively with problems that thé larger 
group could not yet agree on, and if they could do this in 
ways that strengthened instead of weakening the internatio­
nal economic system. Obviously the situation is tricky; 
bilateral and other discriminatory arrangements have been 
the bane of multilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, the 
choice may be between dealing with some problems on this 
narrower basis or not at all and then whether these steps
can be taken in ways that even encourage others to join in
. , 21  the process
There is then the question who might be the countries
taking such action. Different combinations are possible for
different issues. In terms of this paper, all that need
be said is that unlike the situation in 1947 there is nothing
inevitable in the American-European relation. None of the
situations peculiar to that time still exists. The two areas
are less important to one another economically than they 
22were . For the United States both Japan and Canada have 
particular economic importance and present both difficult 
problems and opportunities for new understandings. If the 
negative view of Europe suggested above proves correct, that 
will further reduce the possibilities of progress on a gene­
ral multilateral basis and increase the pressures to deal
Camps and Diebold, cited, deals more extensively with these 
issues, especially in the section on "selective action".
Military and political importance are something else again, 
but it is too late in this paper to try to work out a 




























































































with problems otherwise. As has been said, the risk that 
this will be done in ways that sharpen conflict and add to 
the deterioration of the international economic system is 
considerable. The only real safeguard against it is the 
widespread conviction that the broader system of cooperation 
is worth preserving and broadening even if not all countries 
can march in step. In a way, American acceptance of such a 
possibility was a key factor 30-odd years ago. It is far 
from clear how things stand today.
10. Most of the problems mentioned in this section can 
be thought of as aspects of the difficulties the world is 
having —  and perhaps especially the industrial countries 
—  in coping with great structural changes. These are of many 
sorts and have become more pressing once the growth of the 
'50s and "60s slowed down, macroeconomic policies stopped 
working in a generally satisfactory fashion and the pros­
pects for the future became dimmer. These developments har­
dened resistance to change just when failure to make changes 
became more costly. It put a strain on the system of inter­
national economic cooperation that threatens the existence 
of the system. Here we come to a possible comparison with 
the earlier period we have been discussing. Alan Milward 
has pointed out that the war brought great structural chan­
ges in the world economy so that when countries began deal­
ing with the postwar situation they faced problems beyond 
their power of adaptation by normal means. It was also not 
something the new international economic organizations could 
cope with. As he says, "The intermediary institutions proposed 
hy both the United States and Britain as an essential part 
°f any new multilateral payments system were not of a scope
able to deal with such a massive disequilibrium" 23 This is
quite right, it seems to me, and a more meaningful way of 
Putting the basic issue than to speak simply of a dollar
23Alan S.Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945(University 
°f California Press/Allen Lane,1977).I think time has shown 
that this did not mean the Fund, Bank and GATT had failed as 
Milward suggests.Why the problems of the transitional period 
the dimensions of recovery —  were not seen more clearly is a complex 
question that I believe to be related primarily to other matters than 



























































































shortage. It is also the reason why the Marshall Plan was 
invented only after some $ 10 billion of American aid to 
Europe had proved inadequate. It also goes far to explain 
why Western European economic cooperation seemed such a good 
idea and maybe why the Europeans later turned to their more 





























































































As I have run on, garrulously but sometimes abridging 
great and complicated matters to the point of distorting 
them, I have been drawn into so much detail, and so many 
special subjects, that I have probably said too little about 
the temper of the times, about those early days of Western 
European economic cooperation and the American effort to 
foster and aid it. They were exciting, they were interesting 
and one felt that important things were happening. It would 
be banal to quote Wordsworth on the bliss of living at the 
moment of the French Revolution —  and it would be wrong 
besides. No doubt there were people who felt that way but 
most of those who were dealing with the kind of issues dis­
cussed in my book —  and concerned with those details whose 
importance I mentioned earlier -- had to have a sense of 
the practical and had to deal with workaday matters but at 
the same time could do the unprecedented and could have 
dreams even if they could not safely walk in their sleep.
A good parallel -- and a fine old one —  is suggested 
in a passage that one of my sons, an art historian, has 
translated for me from an account of Europe in the time of 
Charlemagne:
It was the custom in those times, when any 
work had to be done by imperial command (e.g., bridges, 
ships, passageways or the cleaning or covering or finish­
ing of public paths) that the counts executed them through 
their deputies and attendants, at least for small pro­
jects. For large ones, however, and especially in the 
case of new buildings, no duke, or count, or bishop or 
abbot was able in any way to secure an exemption. Indeed, 
the proof of this practice is in the arches of the 
Mainz bridge,which all of Europe truly completed through 
communal work of a most regular perfection. But the frau- 
dulence of certain malevolent men who wished to collect 
unspeakable (?) bribes for the passage of ships destroyed 
the bridge. 24
24Notker the Stammerer,Gesta Karoli Imperatoris;trans.:William 
J-Diebold, lightly edited by me at the risk of departing 
from the literal. W.J.D. remarks that tota Europa is an un­
usual expression for the 9th century;it would be more com- 




























































































The work of tota Europa has not been destroyed; the ar­
ches have not fallen, whatever other damage the fraudulentia 
of the malivorum has done, and that is largely because of 
the doggedness and skill of the artisans of cooperation —  
and no doubt the inspiration that moved them as well. But 
their achievements are threatened. I cannot now enter into 
that set of problems, vital as it is. But I can say that 
there are two basic or pervasive factors that make us less 
able to deal with the current threats than were those who 
began the processes of European cooperation and American 
help and also faced great difficulties. One is that they 
quite generally recognized that they were up against great 
pressures and were in considerable danger; or so they be­
lieved, and that came to almost the same thing so long as 
fears and facts were not too far out of line. Maybe a com­
parable consensus is developing today but it is not yet here 
and far too much is taken for granted that can be sustained 
only by great attention and effort.
The second factor is that in those days all sorts of 
ideas were not just in the air but talked about —  and for 
the most part thought about —  by serious people. You might 
not believe that such big changes could be accomplished, 
but it was not foolish to ask "What if ...?". Great states­
men played with large ideas but so did lesser mortals, not 
just the idealists , nouveau nés (intellectually) and those 
in need of a piece for a feuilleton, but fairly stodgy people, 
often staid businessmen and conservative politicians, who 
might not know the ramifications and subtleties of the ideas 
they were voicing but who felt the need to find new ways.
We do not have very much of that sort of thing these days.
If we do not develop it, we shall —  it seems to me -- suc­
cumb to a deep conservatism of mood that is at the same time 
extremely shallow in its understanding of the state of the 
world and that will almost certainly be self-defeating. What 




























































































One expression of the current inadequacy of thinking, 
understanding, and response to reality is the call for new 
Marshall Plans. We hear this all the time in the United 
States and I suppose you do in Europe as well. Central Ame­
rica, Latin America, the Third World generally, Poland, 
Eastern Europe as a whole (at least, once upon a time), 
cities, poverty, minorities, almost any problem that is big 
enough to get a good deal of attention will be proposed 
as the proper target for "a new Marshall Plan". And this is 
not new; it has been going on for years. It was natural for 
those first concerned with the developing world to speak of 
the Marshall Plan's success as the model; it took time, fai­
lure, disillusion and simple analysis to show why this was 
not only a false but a dangerously misleading analogy. The 
demonstration has to be given over and over again. It is 
the more urgent when not only the underlying economics but 
the basic political conditions are completely different from 
those that made 1947-51 -- to carry matters no farther -- 
basically a success story. Just last summer Robert Schaetzel, 
who lived through all this in the State Department and later 
as the US ambassador to the Communities succinctly spelled
out the fallacies of talking about a "Marshall Plan for 
25Latin America" . Similar correctives are needed to rebut 
the recurrent argument that the way to deal with strained 
relations between the United States and Western European 
countries is to have lectures and courses about the Marshall 
Plan.
It is, of course, a tribute to the Marshall Plan and the 
related European effort that this banality should have be­
come so egregious. But it is a failure of understanding to 
suppose one is saying very much by repeating these words. 
Unique is an overused word but a correct one for the world of 
1947 and the relations between the United States and Western 
Europe. That does not mean that some conditions may not re- 
Peat themselves, or come close enough to amount to the same 
25~  --------------------------------------------------------------^•Robert Schaetzel, Latin Marshall Plan?,New York Times,




























































































thing. There are, surely, some lessons that can be applied 
or that point to what one ought to try to achieve if a Mar­
shall Plan approach, mutatis mutandis, is to be tried. Schaet- 
zel underlines what may be the most important: "The lasting 
benefits ... came about through enlightened West European 
initiatives and leadership". For that leadership to appear 
required special circumstances. Whether the same impetus 
still exists in Europe is a question; on the answer may de­
pend the outcome of some troublesome issues mentioned in 
the last two sections —  but they are not the subject of 
this paper.
In other words, this is an historical paper and part of 
the history it deals with is my book. I have no difficulty 
in leaving it to others to say how the book should be re­
garded as history. At most that is a byproduct of the work 
I thought I was doing. But you have put me in the position 
of also being an historian about my own history, or parts 
of it. That cannot be done in one essay as the scattered na­
ture of the comments in this one shows. Again, I have to 
leave it to you to see what this effort amounts to. I re­
marked, however, on an earlier page, that you were not the 
first to treat the book as history and it is on that note 
that I should like to conclude. Two people have been ahead 
of you.
Robert Marjolin, in the lectures from which I have al­
ready quoted several times, said some very kind things about 
Trade and Payments and let references to it take the place 
of his own accounts of some matters. I reminded him after­
wards that he was in fact one of my major sources for that 
book, having spent time with me on many issues and encou­
raging members of his staff to talk freely with me. So up 
to a point he was approving his past self as well as me.
But who knows where that point is? Until I got your invita­
tion, Marjolin was, so far as I knew, the only person in 
years who had read my book. If he thought well of it -- having 





























































































The other case is completely different, a judgment made 
30 years earlier by someone entirely outside the processes 
described in the book (at least I think so). I should be em­
barrassed even to mention the matter, and so, in a way, I am. 
But I shall overcome my embarrassment because the comment is 
so appropriate to your own treatment of Trade and Payments 
as history. The occasion was a review of the book by Alvin 
Johnson, an American economist who did an extraordinary 
number of things of which some of the best known were editing 
the first Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences and helping 
found and then becoming president of The New School for So­
cial Research in New York which, during the Second World War, 
also housed the University in Exile with a faculty drawn from 
antifascist Europe. He was also my next door neighbor in 
Upper Nyack, New York, and perhaps that explains everything. 
Anyhow, in a generous review in the Spring 1953 number of 
Social Research, a journal published by the New School, Dr. 
Johnson spoke kindly of my scholarship and said I had pro­
vided the guide Americans needed to "what the European states­
men were trying to do with their tangled web". So far, so 
good, but now comes the embarrassing part. He said I was too 
modest. (Such defects are easy to overcome, as you see) .
"Dr. Diebold thinks his book is boring". I do not find this 
in the text. Maybe I said it as I gave a copy to this wonderful 
man —  then 79 —  so he should not feel he had to look at it when he 
would otherwise have been reading Greek and Latin on his back 
Porch in the early morning or growing fine vegetables. Anyhow, 
Dn. Johnson then wrote that he had seen a presentation copy 
°f Arthur Young's Travels in France in which the author apo­
logizes on the flyleaf for being so boring.
"But nobody today deserves a doctorate in economic 
history who does not know and love modest Arthur Young.
I will venture a prediction.One hundred and fifty years 
from now no one will get a doctor's degree in economic 





























































































I don't believe it. Do you? But you, the historians, 
might just make Dr. Johnson's prediction come true. And I 
should like that, for his sake and that of my great grand­
children. But perhaps you have done enough for now, and 
thank you again for making me think.
Upper Nyack and Venice 
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